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The Legal Regime for Protecting Cultural

Property During Armed Conflict
CAPTAIN JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG, USAF*
I. INTRODUCTION
After World War II, codified international law recognized that historic
monuments, archaeological sites, and other artwork is considered the property
of all mankind, rather than that of a single state. This recognition was codified
in the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict,' and reaffirmed in article 53 of the 1977 Additional
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.2 The viability of the 1954
Hague Convention came into question during the 1991 Gulf War when Iraqi
aircraft were intentionally located near the remains of a 3,000 year old
Sumerian temple.3 The United States Air Force was faced with the question of
whether to attack these aircraft, thereby risking collateral damage to the ancient
monument -

which the Convention would permit -

or to avoid the area and

targets.4

the military
The command authority opted for the latter option. As
the Middle East, North Korea, and Southern Europe remain areas of political
* Captain Joshua E. Kastenberg (B.A., UCLA; J.D., Marquette University Law School) is an
assistant staff judge advocate at Whiteman AFB, Missouri. He is a member of the Wisconsin
State Bar. The author gratefully acknowledges the help and insight of Lt Col. Dwight K.
Keller, Lt. Col Dennis Shepherd, Lt Col. Curtiss R. Petrek, 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman
AFB, and in particular Group Captain Alan M. Hemmingway, Director of Air Force Legal
Services, Royal Australian Air Force, Canberra, Australia.
' Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14,
1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention].
2 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protections of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 37(1), 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
There were two additional protocols. Additional Protocol I relates to the protection of victims
of international armed conflicts. Additional Protocol II relates to the protection of victims of
non-international armed conflicts. For the purposes of the essay, only Protocol I is utilized.
3 See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO

CONGRESS 0-2 (APR., 1992) [hereinafter DoD Report]. See also Robert K. Goldman, The
LegalRegime Governing OperationDesertStorm, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 363, 390 (1992).
' DoD Report, supra note 2, at app. 0, pg. 3. The report states that, "Coalition forces
continued to respect Iraqi cultural property, even where Iraqi forces used such property to
shield targets from attack. However, some indirect damage may have occurred to some Iraqi
property due to the concussive effect of munitions directed against Iraqi targets some distance
away from the cultural sites." Id.
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military instability, the likelihood that this type of situation could again arise is
great.
The United States is greatly interested in preserving and protecting
cultural property. Historically, the United States has been a leader in
promoting national laws to protect cultural property.5 Additionally, the United
States, through a number of both federal and state laws has served as an
international policeman for protecting cultural property.6 An attorney need only
research through the myriad of federal and state laws, and judicial decisions to
see the tremendous emphasis placed on the preservation of historic and cultural
sites and objects to confirm this national interest7 . The military attorney should
recognize that from the beginning of this nation, the American military has
' The first such U.S. law was the American Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1910)
(protecting national treasures). Later laws included: The Historic Sites Act of 1935, 16
U.S.C. §462-67 (1937) (preserving historic sites, buildings, and objects of national
significance); The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 , 16 U.S.C. 470 (a)-(w)(6)
(1967) (expanding protection of sites and objects of historic significance); The American
Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1980) (protecting Native American
cultural property); The Archaeologic Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470(aa)-(LL)
(1979) (superseding The American Antiquities Act by legally defining archaelogic terms, and
making this protection enforceable through criminal penalties); The Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §3001 (1990)(expanding protections of Native
American gravesites). See generally Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and CulturalProperty: The
ProtectionnofCulturalProperty in the United States, 75 B.U.L. REV. 559 (1995) (explaining
importance of cultural property to societal identity and growth).
6 See, e.g., The Pre-Columbian Art Act of 1972, 19 U.S.C. §§2091-95 (1988 (protecting
Central and South American treasures from being plundered and then sold in U.S. markets);
The Cultural Property Implementation Act of 1982, 19 U.S.C. § 2601 (1995) (making the U.S.
a full signatory to The UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit, Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, UNESCO Convention,
Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231); The National Stolen Properties Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314
(1988) (expanding theft protections even though not designed strictly for the protection of
cultural properties).
' See, e.g Federal Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973), cert denied,
415 U.S. 931 (1974) (allowing German gov't to recover stolen WWII painting held by U.S. art
dealer); United States v. Hollingshead, 494 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974) (applying National
Stolen Properties Act to antiquities taken from foreign countires); United States v. McClain,
593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979)(holding same as Hollingshead supra); Kunstsammulugen Zu
Weimar v. Elicofon, (678 F.2d 1982) (allowing use of foreign law on protection of art to
recover painting held by U.S. art dealer); Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus
v. Goldberg and Feldman Fine Arts Inc, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990)(tolling statue of
limitations to recover stolen art until owner discovers location of stolen property); Republic of
Turkey v. OKS Partners, 797 F.Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying civil RICO statute to
conspiracy theft of stolen antiquities). For a complete law review synopsis of laws and cases
affecting cultural property in civilian practice, see Joshua E. Kastenberg, Assessing the
Available Actions for Recovery in CulturalProperty Cases, 56 DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. LAW
39 (1995).
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placed an overarching interest in preserving recognized laws of warfare.8
These recognized laws include the doctrine of necessity, which envisions that
where an enemy places fortifications or other objects of military value near a
historic site, the historic site should lose its protected status.
This article examines the depth of customary international law9 - that
is the accepted practices and norms of the international community - with
respect to cultural property, the 1954 Hague Convention and Additional
Protocol One, and Department of Defense and Air Force policy. In order to
properly understand the legal basis for protecting cultural properties under
international law, it is essential to review the development of these protections.
It is also essential to gain a basic knowledge of the basic principles of the law
of armed conflict.1' Section I will discuss the evolution toward a customary
development of an international law of war to protect cultural properties. This
section also notes the basic principles of the law of armed conflict. Section II
examines the terms of the 1954 Hague Convention, and Additional Protocol
' See Russell F. Weigley, American Strategy from its Beginnings through the First World
War, in MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY 408, 412, (Paret ed. 1986). [hereinafter Modem
Strategy] Weigley writes that Washington feared the "tendency of irregular war, with its
violations of the international rules of war, to tear apart the entire social contract, as well as his
specific concern to guard the dignity of the American cause as an essential part of the new
nation's claim to equality of status among the nations of the world." Id. Moreover, in the
Civil War, the Union adopted a code of war named for its founder Professor Francis Lieber to
ensure certain wartime conduct. This code was designed to prevent further degeneration of
fighting to brutality. See GENERAL ORDER No. 100 APR. 14, 1863, in 3 U.S. DEPT. OF WAR,
THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND
CONFEDERATE ARMIES (sER. El) 148, 151 (1902). [hereinafter Lieber Code]
' The charter to the International Court of Justice defines customary international law as, "the
evidence of a general practice accepted as law." I.C.J., art. 38 , (Sept. 14 1929). Customary
international law has also been defined as, over varying periods of time certain international
practices have been found to be reasonable and wise in the conduct of foreign relations, in
considerable measure the result of a balancing of interests. Such practices have attained the
stature of accepted principles or norms and are recognized as international law or practice.
Accordingly, there are in the field of international law, public and private, certain well
recognized principles or norms. AFP 110-20, Selected InternationalAgreements (27 July
1981). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 & cmt. b, cmt. c.
0 AFP 110-31, International Law, The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, 10
(1976). [hereinafter AFP 110-31] AFP 110-31 notes the basic principles of armed conflict as:
Necessity (defined as permitting the application of only that degree of regulated force not y
otherwise prohibited by the laws of war, required for the partial or complete submission of the
enemy with the least expenditure of life and physical resources); Humanity (defined as not
permitting the infliction of injury, suffering or destruction not actually necessary to
accomplish the mission); Chivalry (defined as the conduct of conflicts within well recognized
formalities and courtesies and forbidding treacherous misconduct, the use of poison or the
misuse of protective flags or devices). Id.
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One to the Geneva Convention. Section II also applies the various provisions
of the 1954 Convention into historic perspective for the purpose of reviewing
its effectiveness. Section III will analyze current Department of Defense and
Air Force policy. This article will conclude that the 1954 Hague Convention is
a reflection of customary international law, but has never risen per se to the
level of customary international law. Moreover, while the United States and its
military allies follow, when possible, the basic framework of the 1954 Hague
Convention, they are not bound by it. This article will also discuss the pitfalls
of Additional Protocol One. To date, the United States and several of its
western allies have not signed the additional protocols. Finally, DoD and Air
Force policy is analyzed against the backdrop of customary international law.
H. HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF A CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Since the beginnings of organized society, warfare has encompassed
the occupation of land and destruction of property. Indeed, from ancient times,
success in war and the subjugation of the conquered populations have often
depended on the wholesale destruction of that population's religious and
political centers.11
Despite this character of war, there has been a

" For example, an ancient law of war can be found in the Old Testament. The war code of
DEUTERONOMY states:
When you draw near a city to fight against it, offer terms of peace to it. And
if its answer to you is peace and it opens to you, then all the people who are
found in it shall do forced labor for you and shall serve you. But if it makes
no peace with you, but makes war against you, then you shall besiege it; and
when the Lord your God gives it to your hand you shall put all its males to the
sword, but the women, and the little ones, and the cattle, and everything else
in the city, all its spoil, you shall take as booty for yourselves; and you shall
enjoy the spoil of your enemies, which the Lord your God has given you.
Thus you shall do to all the cities which are very far from you.... you shall
save nothing alive that breathes, but you shall utterly destroy them, the
Hittites and the Amorites, the Canaanites and the Perizittes, the Hivites and
the Jebusites, as the Lord your God has commanded; that they may not teach
you to do according to all their abominable practices which they have done in
the services of their gods, and so to sin against the Lord your God.
DEUTERONOMY 20.10.

This Deuteronomic tradition, which was more or less a reflection of early civilizations' views,
was to have a profound impact on the Christian view of warfare through the Crusades. The
ultimate aim of warfare became the destruction of the enemy's center of religious beliefs
because out of these religious beliefs came societal cohesion. Without societal cohesion, the
conquered society would easily be assimilated into the conquering state and lose its identity.
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countervailing view that certain properties should be free from pillage and
destruction. This view dates back to antiquity. For example, the Greek
Historian, Herodotus (ca. 484-430 BC), chastised the Persian king Xerxes for
plundering Greek and Egyptian religious and political centers. 12 Thus, by 480
BC, the Greeks clearly believed that cultural or ancient treasures should be, if
at all possible, left unmolested in wartime. Thus, the origin of a customary
prohibition against the destruction of cultural properties dates to at least as far
back as classical Greece and perhaps sometime into prior antiquity. That the
Greeks were successful in the Persian Wars ensured a continuance of a
European, or at least a Mediterranean development of laws and legal custom.
Nowhere was an adherence to this early law of war more pronounced than with
Alexander the Great (350-326 BC). Alexander's view on the protection of
historic properties was certainly more enlightened than Xerxes'."
His
Another ancient example can be found in the annals of the ninth century King Ashurnaisirpal
II of Assyria regarding the destruction of an enemy city:
With the masses of my troops and by my furious battle onset, I stormed, I
captured the city; 600 of their warriors I put to the sword; 3000 captives I
burned with fire; I did not leave a single one of them alive to serve as hostage.
Hulai, their governor, I captured alive. Their corpses I formed into pillars;
their young men and maidens I burned in the fire. Hulai, their governor, I
flayed his skin I spread upon the wall of the city of Damdamusa; the city I
destroyed, I devastated, I burned with fire.
DoYNE DAWSON, THE ORIGINS OF WESTERN WARFARE 41 (1996)
12 HERODOTUS, THE PERSIAN WARS Ch.VII, para. 7.8 (Francis Godolphin trans., Modem
Library College ed. 1942)
Herodotus writes that Xerxes declared his intention, "to undertake war and not to rest
until having conquered and burnt all Athens." Id. While not a unique form of warfare to the
ancient Near East, Herodotus discusses this statement in the context of a violation of a Greek
law of war. Xerxes had not limited his anger to Athens and his style of warfare was well
known to Herodotus and the Greeks. For example, according to Herodotus, Xerxes ordered
one of his more renowned generals, Megabyxus to destroy a Babylonian rebellion through the
destruction of its religious and cultural center. "At the end of this successful campaign,
Nebuchadnezzer's fortifications and ziggurat were demolished. Babylon's great estates
carved, looted, and ravaged. As a supreme insult, an eighteen foot statute of the god BelMarduk, built almost of solid gold, was taken and melted into bullion. Babylon's theocratic
monarchy was destroyed and the city lost its last vestige of independence."
Id. For a
particularly good explanation of Xeres' actions see PETER GREEN, THE GRECO-PERSIAN WARS
58 (1996). Even by 480 BC, Babylon was a center of antiquity and the destruction of its
thousand-year old religious center, was in fact an intentional demolition of what was then
considered a world treasure.
13 E.g., upon Alexander's conquest of Babylon, he revitalized its historic and religious center
which had been devastated by Persian rule. Of all the cities conquered, only the burning of
the Persian capitol Persepolis was an exception, and Alexander later regretted this action. See
A.B. BOswORTH, CONQUEST AND EMPIRE: THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT 87 (1988).
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conquest of Persia was marked by a desire to preserve ancient treasures for the
enhancement of a Hellenistic empire.14 It is probable that Alexander's early
education by such luminaries as Aristotle left a desire to create museums and
other centers of education ornamented by other culture's treasures. 5 The
enlightened attitudes of Greek and Macedonian war policy makers left a
tradition that prevailed though subsequent European history. The Roman
Republic and Empire, with its interest in both economic and political
expansion would destroy cities and other cultures as a measure of last resort.
However, Roman history is replete with examples of this "last resort"
philosophy. The destruction of Carthage after the Third Punic War (149-146
BC) provides a classic example on this point. 6 The Romans adopted the
Greek tradition concerning the treatment towards the historic objects of others
during periods of conquest and armed conflict.' This customary tradition
included a propensity for preservation whenever possible. From the fall of
Rome through the Renaissance, the attitude of preservation when possible
prevailed at least in the minds of theorists and philosophers."
The next significant juncture on the limitations of warfare in regard to
centers of cultural property did not occur until over a thousand years after the
destruction of the western Roman Empire. In the period of the devastating
Thirty Years War (1618-1648) one of the founding scholars of international
law, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) attempted to create a basic framework to limit
the destruction in both lives and property that the Europe-wide conflict had
produced." The Thirty Years War had been more destructive to Continental
Id.
See PETER GREEN, ALEXANDER OF MACEDON 41 (1991).
16 See BRIAN CAVEN, THE PuNIC WARS 273-295 (1980).
After Carthage's second revival
14
15

following the defeat of Hannibal, the Roman Republic's government concluded that the
necessity of Carthage's destruction far outweighed any economic gain which Rome could
accrue by a continued trade relationship. Id.
" In the Mediaeval and Renaissance periods, discussion of a doctrine of just war became
prevalent. St. Augustine, for example, saw warfare as only just when carried out for motives
of charity. See St. Augustine, City of God 27 (Henry Bettenson trans.1971). Machiavelli and
Erasmus believed in the limitations ofjust war, and not warfare for the purpose of annihilating
one's enemy.
18 See, e.g. MACHIAVELLI, ARTA DELLA GUERRA [THE ART OF WAR] 48-51 (Bobs-Merrill

trans. 1965). Machiavelli felt that wars should be short, but brutal to the soldiers on the field.
His considerations on laws of war stemmed from his belief that soldiers should come from the
soil for which they fight; that the use of mercenaries in wartime not only undermined the
Roman Empire, but also made war a lawless endeavor. See Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli, The
Renaissance and the Art of War, in MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY 11, 21-31, (Paret ed.
1986).
19 HUGO GRoTIUs, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBIRI TRES [THREE BOOKS ON THE LAW OF WAR

AND PEACE] 1625 (Francis W. Kelsey trans. 1925). Grotius wrote, "such a work is all the more
necessary because in our day, as in former times, there is no lack of men who view this branch
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Europe, than any prior conflict, and it would remain unrivaled in that aspect
until World War One. Indeed, in the Treaty of Westphalia, the signatory
nations conceded that the claims of destruction were so complex as to preclude
any recovery. 0 In the 18th Century, Emeric de. Vattel advanced the premise
that nations should fight wars with the limited purpose of defeating the
enemy's forces." Vattel argued, "Devastations and destructions and seizures
motivated by hatred and passion, however, are clearly unnecessary and wrong:
doubly wrong indeed, if they also destroy some of the common property of
mankind - its inheritance from the past, or its means of subsistence and
enrichment in the present."22
Both Grotius' and de. Vattel's philosophy proved appropriate for the
limited wars of the 18th century. These wars tended to be brief, isolated, and
expensive, thereby limiting their potential for massive destruction.23 By the
close of the 18th century, adherence to the standards of Grotius and de. Vattel
became problematic due to the increased scope of military conflict, such as the
French Revolutionary wars. Napoleon's conquests provided ready exceptions
of law with contempt as having no reality outside of an empty name." Id. at 92. According
to noted historian Geoffrey Parker, Central Europe, in the period of the Thirty Years War,
suffered greater destruction and death than at any period prior to 1939. Grotious and his
contemporaries were appalled by what appeared to be limitless suffering and destruction. See
GEOFFREY PARKER, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR 208-218 (1984).
20

PEACE TREATY BETWEEN THE HOLY ROMAN EMPEROR AND THE KING OF FRANCE AND

[hereinafter Treaty of Westphalia], Oct. 24, 1648, art H (Tufts
University, Olde English trans. 1997). The Treaty of Westphalia later states in art. XLVII:
THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLIES.

from this general restitution shall be exempted things which cannot be
restor'd, as things moveable and moving, Fruits gather'd, Things alienated by
the authority of the Chiefs of the Party, Things destroy'd, ruined, and
converted to other uses for the publick security, as publick and particular
buildings, whether Sacred or Profane, publick or private Gages, which have
been, by suprize of the Enemys, pillage'd confiscated, lawfully sold, or
voluntarily bestow'd.
Id.
21 Emeric de. Vattel, *LES DROIT DES GENS, OU, PRINCIES DE LA LoI NATURELLE, APPLIQUE A
LA CONDUITE ET AUx AFFAIRES DES NATIONS EY DES SOUVERAINES [The Law of Men or

Principles of National Law Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns]
(Charles G. Fenwick trans. pub'd. as The Law of Nations, Wash. D.C. 1916) (1758). See
also GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 65 (1980).

2 Geoffrey Best, supra note 21, at 94. See also Stanlislaw E. Nahlik, InternationalLaw and
the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflicts, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1070-1071
(1976).
2 See Henry Guerlac, Vauban: The Impact of Science on War, in MAKERS OF MODERN
STRATEGY 65-97 (PARET ed. 1986). Guerlac writes that, "the enlightened monarchies of the
eighteenth century tried to spare their civilian populations, both for humane reasons, and as
potential sources of revenue. Id. at 93.
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to the development of a customary international law of warfare. While his
armies generally, attempted to adhere to the principles of both Grotius and E.
de. Vattel, historians and legal scholars point out that French armies from
Egypt to Moscow absconded with a massive collection of art and antiquities.
However, Napoleon's systematic looting of European art was not done for
booty, but to propel the Louvre into the civilized world's center of art and
antiquities.24 This theft of art was not a particularly unusual feature of warfare.
Napoleon routinely engaged in this practice on a greater scale than anyone
since the Roman Empire. In several respects, the wars fought by Napoleon
were a watershed for war in the industrial age. This practice would have a
direct effect on the growing emphasis to protect cultural properties.
Additionally, after Napoleon's final defeat at Waterloo, France was required
under the Second Treaty of Paris to restore works of art to their original state.
The British Representative to the Congress of Vienna, Viscount Castlereagh
had circulated a memorandum which stated that the removal of artwork, "was
contrary to every principle ofjustice and to the, usage of modem warfare."25
During the Napoleonic period, a concept that cultural property was the
property of all humanity, rather than as a prize of plunder, emerged in
international law. For example, in the American and British War of 1812,
certain American scientific prints and paintings were seized by the Royal Navy
from an American Vessel, The Marquis de Somerueles. The petitioners, a
Philadelphia science organization challenged this act in a British Admiralty
Court. Sir Alexander Croke, Judge of the Vice Admiralty Court in Halifax,
Nova Scotia summarized the disposition of law regarding such properties in
the admiralty case, The Marquis de Somerueles.26 Sir Alexander posited that:
"The same law of nations, which prescribes that all property belonging to the
enemy shall be liable to confiscation, has likewise its modifications and
relaxations of that rule. The arts and sciences admitted amongst all
civilisations as forming an exception to the severe rights of warfare, and as
entitled to favour and protection. They are considered not as the peculium of
this, or that nation, but as belonging to the common interests of the whole
species.""

24

See PROCTOR PATTERSON JONES, NAPOLEON: AN INTIMATE ACCOUNT OF THE YEARS OF

SUPREMACY 1800-1814, 257 (1992). Moreover, Napoleon saw himself as creating a center in
Paris for revolutionary monuments to civilization rather than merely seeking French glory and
enrichment. Id.
25 Lakshmikanth Rao Penna, Protection of Cultural Property During Armed Conflict, in
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 258 (Maley ed. 1997).
26 (1813) Stewarts Vice-Admiralty Reports, 482.
27 Td.
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Interestingly, the next significant development in the laws of war
originated in the United States during the Civil War. The War Department and
Abraham Lincoln were increasingly concerned with the Confederate's use of
guerrilla warfare. In 1862, Henry W. Halleck, General- in- Chief of the Union
Armies, sought Professor Francis Lieber's help in drafting a code of laws to
govern the conduct of the war.28 Lieber's code was adopted by the Army as
General Order No. 100 in 1863. Several of its provisions remained significant
for providing definition to principles underlying the laws of war, as well as by
defining war. Lieber defined Necessity as, "those measures which are
indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according
to the modem law and usages of war., 29 Necessity, according to Lieber's
Code, "admits all direct destruction of life and limb or armed enemies, and of
other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in armed contests
of the war .
,3.Of particular significance to this essay was the Code's
attempts at securing the safety of classical works of art, museums, scientific
collections, and libraries.31 The Code placed on both the defender and the
attacker a duty of securing such sites or items, "against all avoidable injury,
even when they are contained in fortified places whilst besieged and
bombarded. 32 General Order No.100 remained an important law of war
reference until the close of the 19th Century when international attempts to
codify a law resulted in the first international agreement on the law of war.
One of the many effects of the industrial revolution was to increase a
nation-state's capability to conduct war.3 A corollary to this increased
capability was that warfare became more violent and overall destructive. By
the close of the 19 'h Century, an international movement to reduce the
destructiveness of war culminated in the two Hague Conventions which were
Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV 1, 7, (1990); Davis, Doctor
FrancisLieber's Instructionsfor the Government of Armies in the Field, 1 AM. J. INT'L LAW
28 Hays-Parks,

13-25 (1907).
' Lieber Code, supra note 7, at 148.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 151.
32 Id. at 150.
3 There are a number of outstanding sources on the subject of industrial revolution,
technology developments, and war. Several of these sources are listed below, but by no means
is this a complete list. See JOHN KEEGAN, THE SECOND WORLD WAR 14-15 (1989);
MARTIN VAN CREVALD,
THEODORE RoPP, WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD (1962);
TECHNOLOGY AND WAR: FROM 2000 B.C. TO THE PRESENT (1989); MARTIN vAN CREVALD
SUPPLYING WAR: LOGISTICS FROM WALLENSTEIN TO PATrON (1977); WALTER MILLIS, ARMS
AND MEN: A STuDY IN AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY (1956); RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, THE
AMERICAN WAY OF WAR: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGY AND
POLICY (1984); and, WILLIAM MCELWEE, THE ART OF WAR: WATERLOO TO MONS (1975).
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concluded in 1899,"4 and 1907. s The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions
produced a codified international law of warfare. Similar provisions in both
Conventions prohibited an invading army from pillaging, and required invaders
to respect the laws of the conquered territory.3 These Conventions also
prohibited the confiscation of private property.37 Finally, cultural objects and
structures were protected under both conventions, and violations of the
Conventions were subject to international sanctions."
Military lawyers,
however, must make note that both Conventions permitted the destruction of
cultural sites and objects, if recognized under the necessities or exigencies of
9
3

war.

The rules established under the Hague Conventions were initially tested
in the First World War. Regions rich in historic and culturally important sites
were affected by widespread combat.4" Incidents such as the German razing of
Belgium's Louvain University, and the bombing of the medieval Rheims
Cathedral in France, triggered international outrage. So too did the looting of
occupied museums and cathedrals. This outrage was manifested in article 245
of the Treaty of Versailles which forced Germany to return all stolen property

" Convention with Certain Powers Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 (1903), T.S. No. 403. [hereinafter 1899 Convention].
" Convention with Other Powers Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
36 For example, read Article 43 of the 1899 Convention. 1899 Convention, supranote 34.
37
See 1899 Convention, supra note 34.
3 Article 56 states that, "[a]l seizure of, and destruction, or intentional damage done to such
institutions, to historical monuments, works of art or science, is prohibited, and should be
made the subject of proceedings." Id.
'9 Article 27 reads:
In sieges and bombardments, all necessary steps should be taken to spare, as
far as possible edifices devoted to religion, art, science, and charity, hospitals,
and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided these are not
used at the same time for military purposes. The besieged should indicate
these buildings or places by some particular and visible signs, which should
previously be notified to the assailants.
Id.
40 Fighting occurred in areas ranging from the "Cradle of Civilization" (Basra - 1915, Kut el
Amara -1915-1916, and Baghdad 1917); Palestine, including the capture of Jerusalem which
the Turks evacuated intact to spare any damage the that city in 1917 and the Sinai (19151917); France (including the shelling of Paris 1914-1918), Macedonia (Salonika 1916-1918),
Turkey (Gallipoli), Britain (London bombed by the German Air Force in 1916-1918); China
and the Pacific; Belgium; and throughout central and eastern Europe. This is by no means a
complete list, but a general scope of events. See generally James Stokesbury, WORLD WAR I
(1984).
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of historic significance. 4' Equally important was the use of airpower during the
conflict. For the first time in history, major population centers were
bombarded from the air.4' The capacity of air forces to destroy enemy
production and population centers from a distance became a reality. This new
feature of modem warfare was recognized in international law tribunals. 43 As a
result, in the 1920's and 1930's, the United States moved to protect historic
sites from destruction by initiating an international agreement known
collectively as the Roerich Pact.' This Pact was limited in its application and
extent, but it did embody the basic tenets of customary international law with
respect to cultural properties. Additionally, the United States Department of
State, the Japanese Imperial Foreign Office, and certain smaller European
nation's diplomatic agencies attempted to codify the rules of air war into a
body of law known as the 1923 Hague Air Rules. 4' The proposed 1923 Hague
Air Rules were never adopted by any nation because the draft set of rules
proved too strict to be acceptable to all powers. 46 Nonetheless, cultural
property was addressed in the proposed Hague Air Rules. Two proposed
articles required commanders to spare, whenever possible, buildings dedicated
4' Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, art. 245, reprinted in, 2 Bevans 43; 3 Malloy 3229.

Article 245 states that:
within six months after coming into force, of the present Treaty, the German
Government must restore to the French Government the trophies, archives,
historical souvenirs, or works of art carried away from France by the German
authorities in the course of the war of 1870-1871, and during this last war, in
accordance with a list which will be communicated to it by the French
Government.
Id.

See J. MORRIS, THE GERMAN AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN 1914-1918 (London 19201969). See generally W. RALEIGH & H. JONES, THE WAR IN THE AIR (Oxford 1922); R.
HIGHAM, AIRPOWER, A CONCISE HISTORY, (1972); and, C. COLE & E. CHESMAN, THE AIR
42

DEFENCE OF BRITAIN,

41

1914-1918 (1984).

See Coenca Brothers v. Germany (1927), in ANNUAL DIGEST OF PUBLIC

INTERNATIONAL

LAW CASES 570-72 (McNair and Lauterpacht, eds. London 1931). Coenca Brothers, was a
mixed German and Greek tribunal which adjudicated a claim against Germany for damages
stemming from the German aerial bombing of Salonica, Greece during the war. The plaintiffs
prevailed as a result of the German commander failing to provide proper warning in
accordance with article 26 of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention. Additionally, at the
time of the bombing, Greece was a neutral country in that it was occupied by allied troops, but
was not an active participant in the war until a later date.
4 Inter-American Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic
Monuments, April 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3267, T.S. No. 899, 167 L.N.T.S. 290 (hereafter Roerich
Pact). Parties to the Roerich Pact include: Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, the United States, and Venezuela.
45 D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 147-157 (1981).
46 Hays Parks, supra note 28, at 35.
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to public worship, monuments and provided for a neutral inspection system to
establish safety areas near these sites.47
Despite international outrage caused by the German Army's excesses in
World War I, in the immediate aftermath of the war all of the belligerent
nations began formulating war doctrine for the next anticipated conflict. In
terms of airpower, Great Britain, Germany, and France concentrated on a
heavy bomber doctrine.48 With the emergence of heavy bombers in the interwar period, the likelihood for the destruction of historic and cultural sites
dramatically increased. During World War I, European and Asian cultural
landmarks were extremely damaged or destroyed outright. Germany in
particular conducted a campaign of widespread looting of Europe's art
treasures.49 Moreover, as no region was immune from battle, historic sites and
47 Id.
48

There are a number of sources on this topic. The most salient are: David MacIsaac, Voices

from the CentralBlue: The Air Power Theorists, in MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY 624-647
(Paret ed. 1986); Viscount Hugh Trenchard, Airpower and NationalSecurity, in THE IMPACT
OF AIRPOWER 211 (Emme. ed 1956); Edward Warner, Douhet, Mitchell, de Seversky:
Theories ofAir Warfare, in MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY 485-503 (Earle ed. 1943); ROBIN
HIGHAM, ARMED FORCES IN PEACETIME: BRITAIN, 1918-1940, A CASE STUDY 52 (1962);
BRIAN BOND, BRITISH MILITARY STRATEGY BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS 21 (1980).
Also, see generally DONALD C. WATT, Too SERIOUS A BUSINESS: EUROPEAN ARMED FORCES
AND THE APPROACH TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR, (1974); MALCOM SMITH, BRITISH AIR
STRATEGY BETWEEN THE WARS (1984); Neil Young, British Air Defence Planning in the
1920's, 2 J. FOR STRATEGIC STUD. 294 (1980).
"9 In contravention of the Hague Convention, Hitler's Germany amassed the largest collection
of European treasures since Napoleon. 'According to the Nuremberg indictment, Germany's
plunder was a destructive as it was confiscatory; over 500 museums were decimated, including
major repositories in Leningrad and Stali ngrad. Over 21,000 items of arts paintings,
furniture, textiles, and similar valuable antiquities were taken. In order to restore artifacts and
artwork to the rightful owner, the United States created, a State Department agency, The
Commission for the Protection and Salvaging of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe.
German disregard for cultural monuments led the Soviet Union to evacuate mass numbers of
books and artifacts from historic centers and museums. The Leningrad Library alone shipped
off over 300,000 of its priceless collection and many of the art museums placed their
collections in deep basements for the duration of the war. German behavior can be contrasted
with allied leadership which made, in comparison, diligent efforts to preserve ancient
treasures. For example, prior to Lt. General Bernard Law Montgomery's 8th Army 1942 El
Alamein offensive, the renowned archaeologist Sir Leonard Wooley was consulted in an effort
to preserve the existence of known archaeologic monuments in North Africa. See LYNN H.
NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPE 215 (1994). Moreover, in 1943, the United Nations issued
a declaration calling invalid all forced transfers of art and other properties in enemy controlled
territory. Id. Finally, the decision to exclude Kyoto as an atom bomb target occurred because
of that city's important place in Japanese history. See Air Force Pamphlet 110-34,
Commanders Handbook on the Law of Armed Conflict (July 25, 1980). [hereinafter AFP 11034] Perhaps the best example of Allied doctrine is General Order 65, December 29, 1943,
circulated by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander Headquarters Allied
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objects were jeopardized by war across the globe. As an example, during the
Italian Campaign, Allied generals deemed it necessary to level the medieval
monastery at Monte Cassino which blocked the access to Rome." The Monte
Cassino episode, by no means an isolated event, came to symbolize the need
for greater protections of cultural properties in wartime.
What had been achieved through the war crimes trials of World War II
as well as the growth of international law analysis after the war, was an
acceptance of a customary internal law of war with respect to the protection of
cultural properties."1 Moreover, the theft and destruction of cultural properties
was seen as an internationally unlawful activity. 2 With this acceptance came a
desire for codification of this customary law. In short, the wholesale
destruction of Europe's cities and the widespread looting of Europe's treasures
Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) regarding the protection of historic monuments during the
Italian campaign:
Today we are fighting in a country which has contributed a great deal to our
cultural inheritance, a country rich in monuments which by their creation
helped and now in their age illustrate the growth of civilization which is
ours. We are bound to respect these monuments so far as war allows. If we
have to choose between destroying a famous building and sacrificing our
own men, then our men's lives count infinitely more and the buildings must
go. But the choice is not always as clear-cut as that. In many cases, the
monuments can be spared without any detriment to operational needs.
Nothing can stand against the argument of military necessity. But the
phrase, "military necessity" is sometimes used where it would be more
truthful to speak of military convenience or even personal convenience. -I
do not want cloak slackness or indifference.
10 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 438 (MAJORIE M. WHITEMAN ED. 1968). See also Hays
Parks, supranote 28, at 61.
0 In March 1944, Lt. General Mark Clark's Fifth Us Army and the British Eighth Army under
the command of Lt. General Oliver Leese (with Field Marshal Harold Alexander in overall
command) were fighting a ponderous campaign up the Italian Peninsula. Leese, Alexander,
Clark, and the ANZAC commander Bernard Freyberg believed that the medieval monastery
was being used as an observation post. However, only after allied aircraft bombarded the
monastery did the Wehrmacht occupy it. Their occupation forced the campaign to an eventual
standstill costing greater numbers of lives and equipment, and creating a veritable propaganda
source for the Germans to use on both their own population, but also to win back Italian
support for the war. See M. BLUMENSON, U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR H, SALERNO TO
CASSINO 395-418 (1969). See also IlI THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR 11, EUROPE ARGUMENT TO V-E DAY, 362-364 (W. Craven & J. Cate, eds. 1951). Finally, the United States
Army pays particular attention to this episode. See DEPT. OF THE ARMY PAM 27-50-127
(1983).
"' James A. R. Nafziger, InternationalPenalAspects of Crimes Against CulturalPropertyand
the Protectionof CulturalProperty,in INT'L CRIM. L. 528 (Bassonini ed. 1991).
52 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544 E.A.S. No. 472. 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
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by German occupying forces accelerated the movement for an effective
international legal protection of historic and cultural property. Nonetheless, as
the following two sections will illuminate, the 1954 Hague Convention failed
to take into account the exigencies of war, and two of the fundamental
accepted principles: necessity and proportionality.
111. 1954 HAGUE CONVENTION
A. History
Forty-five countries signed the 1954 Hague Convention at its inception.
Currently, seventy-five countries have ratified or acceded to the Hague
Convention.53 The variety of signatory countries, with their diverse cultures
and divergent political views, indicates the breadth of support for the
underlying principles of the Convention. It does not necessarily raise all the
provisions of the Convention to customary international law. 4 Indeed, in the
cold war era doctrine of massive retaliation, there could be little application of
the Convention to total war. Nonetheless, for the purposes of non-nuclear
engagements, the Convention was acceptable to a number of nations and
organizations. It was not acceptable to the United States, Great Britain, or
Canada, among other nations, because of its restrictiveness and stretch beyond
customary international law.
The preamble to the 1954 Convention describes armed conflict as the
underlying basis for invoking its rules.5 The genesis of the 1954 Convention
53

Parties to the 1954 Hague Convention include: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burkina-Faso, Burma, Cameroon, Cyprus, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Holy See, Hunger,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kampuchea, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Libya, Liechentstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia,
Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Poland,
Qatar, Rumania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, San Marino, Senegal, Spain, Sudan, Sweden,
Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen, and Zaire.
5 Indeed, the United States and the other nuclear powers had concerns with the convention
because of its impossibility to enforce during a nuclear exchange. In January 1954, in one of
the seminal speeches of the nuclear age, U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles announced
that "the United States intended in the future to deter aggression by depending primarily on a
great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing." John
Foster Dulles, The Evolution ofForeignPolicy, 30 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, Jan 25,
1954.
Dulles' statement evolved into what became known as the doctrine of massive
retaliation. Lawrence Freidman, The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists, in
MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY 740 (Paret ed. 1986).
" Hague Convention, supra note 1, at 240. The Convention states that its originators were
"[g]uided by the principles concerning the protection of cultural property during armed
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can be traced to article 56 of the 1907 Convention. 6 Article 56 of the 1907
Convention states that "all seizure or destruction or willful damage done to the
institutions of this charter, historic documents, works of art and science, is
57
forbidden, and should be made subject to legal proceedings."
However, unlike its predecessor conventions, the 1954 Convention
introduced the term "cultural property" and gave it definition. 8 Moreover, the
1954 Convention expanded protection for cultural property to all armed
conflicts rather than just full-scale wars by eliminating the loopholes of the
1899 and 1907 Conventions. 9 The 1954 Convention also designated an
international symbol for nations in order to protect cultural property. The
presence of cultural property is to be indicated by a blue and white shield.6
This shield may be placed as an insignia on sites or flown in flag form.6 '
Finally, the 1954 Convention created an International Register of Cultural
Property Under Special Protection (Resister).6 ' However, to date, the Register
is woefully incomplete.63
Article 3 places an affirmative duty on signatory parties to protect
cultural property situated within their territory.' This is reinforced by Article
4 which also places an affirmative duty on all signatory parties to respect
cultural property situated both within their own territory and additionally in the
territory of other states.6 Additionally, Article 4 disallows the use of cultural

conflict, as established in the Conventions of The Hague of 1899 and 1907 and the
Washington Pact of 15 April 1935." Id.
5 Convention with Other Powers Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, art. 56, T.S. No. 539.
Id.
58 Cultural Property is defined as including both moveable and immovable property, but also
buildings containing moveable property and centers containing concentrations of monuments.
1954 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, 249 U.N.T.S. at 242.
" See Nahlik supra note 23, at 1077. See also Marion Haunton, Peacekeeping Property,
Occupation, and Cultural Property, 12 U.B.C. L. REV. 217 (1995) (arguing that the
provisions of the 1954 Hague Convention extend to U.N. Peacekeeping missions).
60 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 16, 249 U.N.T.S. at 244.
6!
Regulations for the Execution of the 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art 12, 249
57

U.N.T.S. at 276.
62 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 12, 249 U.N.T.S. at 276.
63 See FRITZ KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 38 (1987); Nahlik, supra
note 22, at 1087.
" 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 3, 249 U.N.T.S. at 244. This is a continuation
of the philosophy encompassed in article 27 of the 1899 Hague Convention. See Convention
with Certain Powers Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, supra
note 20, at art. 27.
65 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 4, 249 U.N.T.S. at 244.
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property or the protective insignia to protect military equipment or forces.66
Article 4 also disallows the destruction of cultural property for the purposes of
reprisal.67 Moreover, Article 4 does not permit a violating state to plead a
defense of ignorance.68
Protection of cultural property in occupied territories is governed by
Article 5.69 Article 5 requires an occupying force to allow the "competent
authorities" of the occupied territory to ensure preservation and protection of
cultural property.7" In circumstances where the occupied territory lacks
competent authorities, the occupying forces are under a duty to assist in the
repair of damaged sites and monuments.7" On this point, the 1954 Convention
is without clear guidance.72 For example, Israeli archaelogic excavations in the
occupied territories and in the Golan Heights were made by several of the
world's foremost archaeologists, which prompted Arab protests. UNESCO
responded to Arab pressure over these excavations and withheld financial
assistance for Israeli science and education projects.7'
Article 7 delegates the signatories to, "introduce in peacetime into their
military regulations or instructions such provisions as may ensure observance
of [the 1954 Convention] and to foster in the members of their armed forces a
spirit of respect for the culture and property of all peoples."74 Moreover, the
Convention sets forth as an objective for each signatory to employ specialists
whose purpose, is to foster respect and security for the principles of cultural
property protections.75
The 1954 Convention recognizes the exigencies of war by permitting
each state to construct a limited number of refuges for moveable cultural
property via Article 8.76 As a result, defending nations must situate these
refuges at adequate distances from large industrial centers and important
' Id. Article 4 states, "contracting parties shall refrain form any use of the property and its
immediate surroundings, or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes which are
likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event or armed conflict." Id.
67 Id. Artcle 4(4) states "[parties] shall refrain from any act directed by way of reprisals

against cultural property." Id.
Id. Article 4(5) states "[n]o... party may evade the obligations incumbent upon it under
the present Article, in respect of another... party by reason of the fact that the latter has not
applied the measures of safeguard referred to in Art 3." Id.
68

69

Id.

70 Id.

71

72

Id.
James A. R. Nafziger, UNESCO - Centered Management of InternationalConflict over

CulturalProperty,27 HASTINGS L. J. 1051 (1976).
3 id.
' 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art 7, at 246.
75 Id.
76

Id. at art. 8.
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military objectives." A state may not place such objects at an airdrome or port
of entry. The exception to this rule is where the state has constructed "bombproof' shelters for moveable objects.78 Nonetheless, a defending nation's
failure to carry out this affirmative duty to isolate its cultural properties results
in the loss of protected status for them.
Articles 9, 10, and 11 create conditional immunity and subsequent
withdrawal of immunity for cultural property sites. Article 9 creates an
internationally recognized emblem for the protection of cultural properties.
(see appendix 1) The use of this emblem creates a recognized immunity from
bombardment or air attack.79 Where a state engages in an unlawful ruse, or
purposefully endangers its cultural property by design, immunity is considered
withdrawn. 0 This includes withdrawal of immunity for cultural property listed
on the Register.81 Additionally, where objects of cultural property are being
transported, a state may seek the protections of the Convention by labeling the
transport vehicles with the emblem and by notifying the opposing state. 2
Articles 12 and 13 cover the transportation of cultural property.
Modes of transportation are generally immune from attack as long as the
appropriate symbol is displayed and the other parties have been notified.83 In
cases of urgency, notification can be waived, but under no circumstances may
the transporting party display the use of the emblem unless immunity has been
expressly granted to it through the Register or some other recognized means.84
Articles 14 and 15 encompass basic 20' Century customary laws of
warfare. Article 14 prohibits the seizure of cultural property as prizes or
trophies of war. 5 While the concerns over the looting and pillaging of artwork
and antiquities dates back beyond Alexander the Great, Article 14 was created
in direct response to the German Military's looting during World War II.
Individuals such as Herman Goring acquired massive collections of classic
artwork during the war. Moreover, several high ranking Nazi officials were
tried and convicted of crimes involving the destruction and pillage of cultural
property. One of the Nuremberg defendants, Alfred Rosenberg, set up an
77

Id.

78

Id.

Id. See also Hays Parks, supra note 28, at 62. Professor Parks correctly asserts that
"responsibility for the protection of objects in the main lay with the defender, not with the
attacker, in that it is recognized that the former had the greatest control over the persons or
objects for whom the protection was sought. Id.
" 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 11, at 246.

71

81 Id.
82 Id.
83

Id. at art. 12, at 250.

14 Id.,

at art. 13..

" Id. at art. 14, at 252.
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organization titled the 'Hohe Schule' and under Hitler's orders created the
'Einsatzstab Rosenberg' which plundered artwork and cultural property
throughout Europe. According to the International Military Tribunal, more
than 21,903 art objects were looted by Rosenberg's group. 6 This practice was
condemned in ajoint declaration by the victorious powers in 1945."
Neither Article 14, nor the declaration, stopped Iraqi forces from
pillaging in Kuwait during their brief occupation. During the conflict, the
United Nations Security Council demanded the return of Kuwait's collections
of Islamic Art.88 The Kuwait National Museum, as well as the Seif Palace
Reception Library, were destroyed. Tariq Aziz, then Iraq's foreign minister,
promised to return these items." This return was mostly accomplished by
October 1991." 0
The 1954 Convention views persons involved in the transport,
identification, and protection of cultural properties as non-combatants under
Article 15.91 The 1954 Convention never answers the question as to whether
uniformed personnel - otherwise viewed as combatants under international
law - working in these tasks are also to be considered non-combatants.
However, an international identity card is authorized. Each contracting party
decides the format of their respective identity card; there is no standard card
design. The Convention provided an example as a guideline, but not a
requirement.92 (see appendix 2)
Articles 16 and 17 govern the use of the distinctive emblem.93 A state
that willfully and unlawfully uses the emblem engages in perfidy. 94 The
86

Rosalie Balkin, The Protection of CulturalProperty in Times ofArmed Conflict, in DEV. IN

INT'L HUMANITARIAN L., AUSTRALIAN RED CROSS 247 (Maley ed. 1997).
87

DECLARATION REGARDING THE FORCED TRANSFER OF PROPERTY IN ENEMY CONTROLLED

TERRITORY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN,
88
89

Penna, supra note 25, at 267.
1992 U.N.Y.B. 195, U.N. Doc. 1191.

21-22 (1949).

90 Id.

91 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 15, at 252.
92 Regulations for the Execution of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict 54 (14 May 1994).
9 Article 17 states:
USE OF THE EMBLEM
1. The distinctive emblem repeated three times may be used only as a means
of identification of:
(a) immovable cultural property under special protection;
(b) the transport of cultural property under the conditions provided for in
Articles 12 and 13;
(c) improvised refuges provided for in the Regulations in the execution of
the Convention.
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rationale of this rule is that if protected status or protective emblems are
abused, they lose their overall effectiveness and put protected persons and
places at additional risk."
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, the Convention was invoked to
protect cultural properties in both Cambodia and in the Middle East. 96 In 1975,
Cambodian loyalist troops (of the Lon Nol regime) attempted to use the
thousand-year old temple of Preah Vihear as a stronghold against the Khmer
Rouge. The loyalists used the sanctioned emblem, but did so under illicit
circumstances. Moreover, ownership over the Preah Vihear temple was
already in dispute with Thailand.97 Because the Lon Nol troops represented a
government which had signed the 1954 Convention, there was little support for
continued fighting within the temple's perimeter. Finally, if damage to the

2. The distinctive emblem may be used alone only as a means of identification
of:
(a) cultural property not under special protection
(b) the persons responsible for the duties of control in accordance with the
Regulations for the Execution of the Convention
(c) the personnel engaged in the protection of cultural property;
(d) the identity cards mentioned in the Regulations for the Execution of the
Convention.
3. During an armed conflict, the use of the distinctive emblem in other cases
than those mentioned in the preceding paragraphs of the present Article, and
the use for any purpose whatever of a sign resembling the distinctive emblem,
shall be forbidden.
4. The distinctive emblem may not be placed on any immovable cultural
property unless at the same time there is displayed an authorization duly dated
and signed by the competent authority of the High Contracting Party.
Id.
" Acts of perfidy are defined as exceptions designed to invite the confidence of the enemy to
lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protected status under the law
of armed conflict, with the intent to betray that confidence. Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protections of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 37(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. Again, this philosophy is first
codified in the 1899 Hague, article 34 which states that: The envoy loses his rights of
inviolability if it is proved beyond doubt that he has taken advantage of his privileged position
to provoke or commit an act of treachery. See 1899 Convention, supra note 35, at art. 34.
" Captain J. Ashley Roach, USN/JA, Ruses and Perfidy: Deception DuringArmed Conflict,
23 UNIv. TOL. L. REv. 401, 423 (1992).
96 David A Meyer, The 1954 Hague CulturalProperty Convention and its Emergence Into
Customary International Law, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 358, 369 (1996). See also Gael M.
Graham, Protection and Revision of CulturalProperty,21 INT'L LAw. 755, 770 N.67 (1996).
97
See, e.g. Case Concerning The Temple at Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 1962 I.C.J.
6 (June 15).
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ancient site had occurred, both the Khmer Rouge and the Thai government
would have had recourse through the 1954 Convention against the loyalist
troops.9"
In the 1980's, the Near East and Persia became a locus of concern for
protecting cultural properties. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon. The neighbor
Arab nations submitted a resolution to the United Nations General Assembly
requesting that Israel make full restitution for damaged archives and other
monuments.99 The General Assembly Resolution did not cite the 1954
Convention or the additional protocol. Instead, the Resolution relied on
customary international law arguments. In all probability, the complex
situation in Lebanon, involved Palestinian irregulars, a Syrian sponsored force,
and other splinter groups that were already violating the 1954 Convention on
their own accord. Additionally, by the time of the Israeli invasion, the
Lebanese government had collapsed and no recognized entity was capable of
lodging complaints against any of the warring parties."° Finally, Israel had not
specifically violated the strict letter of the law in the 1954 Convention.
During the Iran-Iraq War of the early 1980's, the 1954 Convention was
given international consideration. Iraqi forces attacked cultural sites in Iran
that were not listed on the International Register, but which had been noted to
the 1972 World Heritage Convention by Iran."'1 The World Heritage
Convention was attended by a variety of nations which sought to register sites
of cultural importance for preservation and for reasons environmental
endangerment. Both Iraq and Iran signed the 1954 Convention without
reservation, but the United Nations was impotent in enforcing its provisions. 2
United Nations impotency in enforcing the 1954 Convention was seen during
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. 3
98

The likelihood of the Thai Government pursuing an action against the loyalist government

was unlikely. The Khmer Rouge was regarded as a universal enemy by both the loyalists and
the Thai government.
" U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess. Annex, Agenda Item 34, at 4, U.N. Doc. a/37/L.50/REV.1(1982),
revised by, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/123B (1982).
'o See Michael Carver, Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age, in MAKERS OF MODERN
STRATEGY 789 (Paret ed. 1986).
101 The Jome Mosque in the city of Isafhan was attacked by Iraqi forces. Inside the city were
a number of ancient monuments, again, not listed on the Register. See Balldn, supra note 86,
at 247.
102 The 1972 World Heritage Convention created an inventory to include, "documentation
about the location of property in question and it's significance" Convention Concerning
Protection of World Cultural Property and Natural Heritage Nov. 23, 1972 U.S.T. 40
(hereafter, 1972 World Heritage Convention). See also Meyer, supranote 71, at 365-66.
103 See Julian G. Pilon, The Report that the UN. Wants to Supress: Soviet Atrocities in
Afghanistan, HERITAGE FOUND. REP., JAN 12, 1987, at 44; Herbert S. Okin, Situation in
Afghanistan, DEPT. OF STATE BuLL. 84 (Jan 1987).
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During the Gulf War, a legal regime was set-up to effectively adhere to
the letter and the spirit of the 1954 Convention. This regime did not recognize
the 1954 Convention as binding, but rather the regime recognized the
Convention as an advisory document. Of the coalition members, the United
States, Great Britain, and Canada were not signatories. According to the DoD
Report to Congress, military members in the coalition forces received law of
armed conflict training. As a result, the 1954 Convention's provisions were
followed during the war."° It is presumptive to state with certainty that the
United States accepts the 1954 Hague Convention's provisions as customary
international law. Nonetheless, the United States and the Coalition forces
honored the spirit of the Convention. Iraqi forces did not adhere to the
Convention and pillaged Kuwait of private property. Finally, the Hague
Convention is applicable to the current conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
While Yugoslavia existed it had over 9000 registered historic landmarks from
the Roman, Byzantine, Renaissance, Islamic, Baroque, and Gothic periods.
Many historic structures, such as during the siege of Dubrovnik, suffered
extensive damage. Also, artwork was looted by several parties. It may be the
case that war crimes trials will indict individuals responsible for the
devastation of historic sites.
With the existence of international controls for the protection of
civilians or sites in wartime, why aren't the violator states punished? This
question has been debated and explored at length and it is particularly salient
because of the customary international law status of the 1954 Hague
Convention protections. Whitney R. Harris, both a United States prosecuting
attorney at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, and an eminent legal scholar in
the field, provides a parallel answer. The primary reason the Nuremberg
precedent has not been applied following the several military conflicts of the
last half century is that they have, for the most part, been terminated by ceasefire agreements which made it impossible to obtain personal jurisdiction over
suspected war criminals. In two cases where unconditional surrender could
have been imposed upon aggressor nations - Argentina's seizure of the
Falkland Islands, and Iraq's seizure, by force of Kuwait - the victorious
powers elected to permit the leadership that had committed aggression to
remain in power, and the aggressors therefore escaped prosecution and
punishment. 5 So to, does the failure of enforcement of the Hague protections.
' DoD Report, supranote 2, app. 0 at 3. The report states that, "Since U.S. military doctrine
is prepared consistent with US law of war obligations and policies, the provisions of the 1954
Convention did not have any significant adverse effect on planning or executing military

operations. Id.
105 Whitney R. Harris, A Call For An International War Crimes Court: Learning From

Nuremberg, 23 UNIV. TOL. L. REV.229 (1992).
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B. Additional Protocol One
Between 1974 and 1977 a number of countries attempted to update the
1949 Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts. The Conference declared that the 1954 Hague Convention
was, "of paramount importance for the international protection of the cultural
heritage of mankind. ' 1°6 Article 53107 of Additional Protocol One reaffirms the
tenets of the 1954 Hague Convention, and encourages states - such as the
United States - to become a signatory party. Article 16 of Additional
Protocol I is substantially similar to Article 53. The fact that as late as 1977,
there was an urging of non-signatory parties to sign the 1954 Hague
Convention is one indication that the 1954 Hague Convention is a reflection of
customary international law, rather than per se customary international law.1"8
The greatest departure from customary international law by Additional
Protocol One is that the attacker assumes a greater burden than ever before for
the protection of cultural properties.0 9 Prior to 1977, responsibility for the
protection of cultural properties rested with the defender and not the attacker.10
The 1954 Hague Convention at least recognized that the defender had greater
control of the cultural properties within its borders. It also recognized in the
inevitability of collateral damage incident to military operations. The
Additional Protocol ignores both the exigencies of war, and the principles of
necessity and proportionality to an unacceptable degree, and in contrary to
of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
HumanitarianLaw Applicable in Armed Conflicts: Geneva 1974-1977, Res. 20 (IV), 4th Sess.,
55th plen. mtg., at 213 (1977). [hereinafter Official Records].
107 Additional Protocol, supranote 2, at art. 53, at 7. Article 53 provides as follows:
106Official Records

Without prejudice to the provisions of the Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May
1954; and of other relevant international instruments, it is prohibited:
a. to commit any acts of hostility directed against the historic monments,
works of art or places of worship which constitute cultural or spiritual
heritage of peoples;
b. to use such objects in support of the military efforts;
c. to make such objects the object of reprisals.
Id.
"' See Christopher Greenwood, Customary Law Status of the 1977 Geneva Protocols, in
HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, CHALLENGES AHEAD, ESSAYS INHONOR OF FRITZ
KALSHOVEN 92, 110 (Astrid J.M. Delissen & Gerrard J. Tanja eds., 1991).

"I Hays-Parks, supra note 24, at 62.
110
Id.
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customary international law."' This philosophy is found in Article 52 of the
Additional Protocol which not only defines acceptable military targets but
presumes that all peacetime non-military targets remain non-military in
wartime"
Article 52 is problematic because too many states have shielded
lawful military targets on or near sites of cultural property." 3 Article 53 is to
be read 'subject to other relevant instruments,' namely Article 52. If the
United States and its allies are to act as global policemen, the Additional
Protocol places an onerous burden on any operation where the protection of
cultural property is an important issue. In sum, the Additional Protocol steps
outside of the boundaries of customary international law of war with regard to
the protection of cultural property, by shifting the burden to the attacker and
ignoring the exigencies of war which would tend to encourage the shielding of
legitimate military targets by placing them in or near cultural property sites.
IV. PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTIES IN OPERATION:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Department of Defense Directive 5100.77'14 requires all branches of the
armed forces to comply with the law of war in conducting military operations
and related activities of armed conflict regardless of how the operation is
characterized." 5 The DoD directive directs that the service branches "institute
and implement programs to prevent violations of the law of war." Training
armed services members in the Law of War (often referred to as the law of
armed conflict) is requirement of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The United
..Id. Professor Hays Parks writes that the traditional burden placed on the defender "was
abandoned in the Additional Protocols and the burden essentially shifted to the attacker despite
clear evidence that many nations in the intervening years regularly used hospitals, cultural
objects, civilian objects, and civilian population to shield lawful targets from attack." Id.
112 Additional Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 52, at 52. Article 52 reads in pertinent part that
legitimate targets are "limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose, or use
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,
capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage." [emphasis added] Id. Article 52 further reads that, in case of doubt, "a place of

worship, a house, or other dwelling, or a school ... shall be presumed not to be so used." Id.
As W Hays Parks correctly asserts, this presumption is tailor made for the defender. Hays
Parks, supranote 28, at 136.
"3 See DoD Report, supranote 3, app. 0, at 3. During the Vietnam conflict as well, the North
armed the temple of Ankor Wat.
"' Department of Defense Directive 5100.77, DOD Law of War Program, (July 10, 1979).
[hereinafter DODD 5100.77] The Air Force implemented this Directive in Air Force
Instruction 51-401, Training & Reporting To Insure Compliance with the Law of Armed
Conflict, (1 July 1994).
"' DODD,

supra note 114, at paras. D. 1 & E.l.a(3).
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States Air Force implements the DoD Directive through AFP 110-34,
discussed below, as well as requiring annual LOAC training for all of its active
11 6
duty members.
United States Air Force policy for protecting cultural objects during
armed conflict is found in Air Force Publication 110-34."' The policy speaks
to reasonableness but maintains a duty on the defender state to accord to either
the 1954 Convention, 1925 Roerich Pact, or a valid custom of protection.'
Objects and sites of cultural value may be attacked whenever the enemy uses
such objects for the protection and cover of military equipment or other
military purposes."' AFP 110-34 also recognizes that while the United States
is not a signatory to the 1954 Convention, many of our allies are not also, in
particular the United Kingdom, and most of our recent adversaries are
recognizes the emblem
signatories. 2 ' As such, the United States Air Force
2
1
Convention.1
Hague
1954
the
of
16
Article
found in
A variety of instances make a cultural property object or site a
legitimate target. Military targets can include any areas that house or support a
military mission. 122 This is a more realistic interpretation of customary
international law than is Additional Protocol One. Thus, an area in which the
enemy stores armored vehicles, aircraft, weapons, production sites, or other
or energy
production sites vital to warfare (i.e. petroleum processing plants
23
production centers) are all technically considered valid targets.
An equally salient provision in AFP 110-34 relates to collateral
damage. It is up to the commander in the field, based on the facts known at the
time, to determine whether the risk of collateral damage is necessary for the
accomplishment of a legitimate mission, or when collateral damage becomes
excessive. 12 This is an eminently more realistic standard than found in
Additional Protocol One.
See AFPD 51-4, Compliancewith the Law ofArmed Conflict (26 April 1993), at para 1.5.1.
See AFP 110-34, Commander's Handbookon the Law ofArmed Conflict .(25 July 1980) at
para 1.5.1. (AFP 110-34 to become AFI 51-709).
I181d.
116

117

119 Id.
120.Id.
121

Id.

12Id.

11 Id. at3.
124
Id. at 8. AFP 110-34, ch. 3-8(a) states:
No definite rule can be applied to determine if the civilian casualties that
might result from the attack are excessive. The commander in each case,
must make an honest and reasonable decision, based on all the facts known
at the time, as to whether the military advantage from a particular attack is
worth the expected civilian casualties. He must make this decision even if
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In Operation Desert Storm, the Coalition forces proved that they could
adhere to the limits of customary international law and prevail. Coalition
forces could have lawfally attacked military threats in and around centers of
However, in accordance with the set Rules of
cultural importance.
Engagement - set by the commanders in charge of the war - they did not
strike these areas when cultural objects were likely to suffer collateral
This remained so despite Iraq's failure to comport with
damage.125
international law by segregating its military targets from centers of cultural
property. 26 For instance, the Sumerian temple, which Iraq found as a welcome
location for a few of its fighter aircraft, was a legitimate target. The Rules of
Engagement, created by the commanders, would make it so only if it were an
absolute necessity. The scenario that played out evidenced that the 1954
Hague Convention, as a reflection of a customary international law of war to
protect cultural properties, was an appropriate and practical guide to follow.
Had those aircraft been suspected as nuclear ready, an airstrike would have
been permissible. Under the regime envisioned by Additional Protocol One,
such a strike would not have been permissible. No customary international law
of war would permit the utter devastation of an internationally recognized
coalition force because-of a de minimis lingering doubt.
V. CONCLUSION
The protection of cultural properties in armed conflict has long been
recognized to be an important consideration for participant states and military
forces in these conflicts. For over two millennium, a custom has evolved to
force states to recognize and live up to the requirements of customary
Additionally, customary international law places
international law.
requirements on both attacker and aggressor states, as well as occupation
the enemy has deliberately used civilians to shield military objectives.

[emphasis added].
Id.
AFP 110-34, ch. 3-8(d) applies ch. 3-8(a) to objects and states:
A similar reasoning process should be used to decide whether excessive
damage to these persons or objects would be caused by a particular attack,
and whether some alternative form of attack would lessen collateral damage
and casualties.
Id.
"2Lt. Col. John G. Humphries, USAF, Operations Law and the Rules of Engagement, in
OperationsDesertShield and DesertStorm, AIRPOWER J. (FALL 1992) at 35.
126 Id.
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forces. Finally, customary international law permits the use of the doctrines of
necessity and proportionality to overcome the protections afforded to cultural
property sites and objects. The 1954 Hague Convention is a reflection of the
development of customary international law, and both the military attorney and
However, the 1954
commander should see the Convention as such.
Convention Hague is binding law in most of its provisions, and thus is a salient
guide to what that law is. The 1977 Additional Protocol is not an accurate
assessment on the law of war in regard to the protections which cultural
properties should be afforded during armed conflict. Where a defender state
harbors items of military value, or has done so previously - and for that
matter, when the available intelligence shows so - in or near cultural
property, the property loses its legal protections. And, while no commander
wishes to create another Monte Cassino, the loss of lives and possibly
objectives may very well outweigh the protections for the site or object.
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APPENDIX 1

HAGUE SYMBOL

ROERICH PACT SYMBOL
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APPENDIX 2

r I
SUGGESTED CARD
Front of Card
IDENTITY CARD for personnel engaged in the protection of cultural
property
Surname

First names

Date of Birth

Title or Rank

Function

is the bearer of this card under the terms of the Convention of The Hague,
dated 14 May 1954, for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of
Armed Conflict.
Date of issue
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Number of Card

Reverse Side of Card

Signature of bearer or fingerprints or both

Embossed stamp
of authority issuing card

Height

Eyes

Hair

Other distinguishing marks
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